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 DoD acquisition efforts have not improved significantly since at least 
the 1960s, when the first large scale analysis of DoD acquisition 
performance took place.   
 The Department of Defense (DoD) continues to face numerous 
difficulties in its acquisition of Major Defense Acquisition Projects 
(MDAPs) 
 A 2006 RAND report found that the average adjusted total cost 
growth for a completed program was 46 percent (RAND TR-343) 
 The roughly 100 MDAPs under development during fiscal year 2007 
experienced average cost growth of 26 percent and average schedule delay 
of 21 months over initial estimates  (GAO-08-1159T) 
 GAO also estimated that these programs will cost $295B more than 
originally projected 
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Costs Growth Creates Serious Problems 
Budget shortfalls lead to actions that often 
include: 
 Reprogramming, leading to shortfalls elsewhere 
 Quantity reductions, that often mean less efficient 
production, and significantly reduced force 
effectiveness 
 Reduced credibility in future estimates 
Long history of swings between the use of 
cost-plus and fixed-price in an effort to 
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Two Primary Types Of Defense Contracts 
Cost reimbursement—Government reimburses the contractor for 
actual cost incurred 
 Various profit arrangements are possible, such as fixed-fee, no fee, cost 
sharing, incentive, award fee 
 Fixed-price—contractor undertakes the work for a fixed amount of 
compensation 
 Often combined with incentives, where there is a target price, as well as 
a ceiling price   
  A fixed-price contract only makes sense when:  
 The uncertainties can be reduced so that reliable estimates can be made  
 Contract changes are kept to a minimum 
 Often neither is the case with MDAPs 
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Challenges in MDAPs Acquisition 
 MDAPs face a high level of uncertainty 
 The uncertainties inherent in these projects stem from a variety 
of factors, including: 
 the hundreds or thousands of interrelated design details required 
 the incorporation of new technologies, processes, and materials  
 the use of specialized equipment brought together to produce first-
of-a-kind products  
 budget changes 
 quantity changes 
 Consequently, neither the military sponsor, nor its contractors 
can accurately estimate the time, or costs, a project will require  
 It is sometimes difficult to know with high confidence whether it is 
even possible to achieve all the objectives of a project. 
 
 
May 16, 2012 
5 
Fixed-Price development Contracts 
  
Research Questions 
What outcomes DoD can expect when fixed-
price contracts are used for development of 
weapon systems? 
 How has DoD utilized fixed-price contracts for 
development in the past? 
 What have been the typical results of fixed-price 
contracts?  
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Historical cases in MDAPs Acquisition 
The C-5 Galaxy 
F-111 Aardvark 
A-12 Avenger II 
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The C-5 Galaxy Background 
 RFP was issued in December 1964 
 Three companies responded—Boeing, Lockheed, and Douglas (later 
McDonnell-Douglas) 
 Lockheed nearing the end of its C-141 production, was almost 
completely dependent on DoD 
 This was a must win, or they would need to layoff 10,000 personnel 
 Source Selection Board picks the Boeing proposal ($2.2B)  
 Douglas proposal ($2.0B)  was judged inadequate, and Lockheed’s 
proposal ($1.9)  met requirements, but last minute design changes were 
not adequately reflected in the cost and schedule  
 AF leadership overruled the Source Selection Board 
recommendation and picked Lockheed based on low-cost 
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The C-5 Galaxy 
 Large, complex strategic airlift aircraft 
 Only 18 yds. shorter than football field, 223 ft. 
wingspan, and a tail that is 6 stories high 
 Short field land capability, terrain following 
radar, precision airdrop 
 Fixed price incentive contract 
 Ceiling price was 130% of target, with a 70/30 cost share 
 Total Package Procurement System (TPPS) for 115 C-5As 
 Incorporated all development, production, and support 
procurements  
 Initial order was for 58 aircraft with a pricing formula for the 
remainder 
 Any costs above the ceiling price would be borne by the contractor 
(Lockheed)--assuming no government changes. 
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The C-5 Galaxy Cost Overrun 
 Program suffers from many changes 
 300 changes, 1600 pages of modifications, and 783 
clarifications in contract definition stage   
 Significant technical and production problems arose in the 
development phase (e.g. Static stress tests produced wing 
cracks, landing gear issues, terrain following radar)  
April 1965 October 1968 
R&D (5 A/C) $   977.0M $1,002.7M 
1st Production Run (53 A/C) $1,210.0M $1,551.1M 
2nd Production Run (62 A/C) $   891.0M $1,808.3M 
Spares $   293.0M $   968.0M 
Total $3,371.0M $5,330.1M 
58% Increase 




 Lockheed experienced a 
serious financial crisis 
 Production was limited to 81 
A/C (vs. the planned 115) 
 Production aircraft were 
accepted with acknowledged 
deficiencies 
 Lockheed agreed to accept 
$200M loss, and the contract 
was restructured to cost-
minus the $200M fixed loss  
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F-111 (“TFX”) Background 
 The AF and USN were both seeking new fighter aircraft, when Robert 
McNamara was appointed as SecDef in January 1961 
  In February 1961, McNamara directed that the services study the development 
of a single aircraft that would satisfy both requirements.  
 In June 1961, Secretary McNamara approved the development of the Tactical 
Fighter Experimental (TFX) –an RFP was issued in October 1961.  
 In December proposals were received from Boeing, General Dynamics, 
Lockheed, McDonnell, North American and Republic.  
 Air Force reviewers favored Boeing's offering, but the Navy found both submissions 
unacceptable for its operations.  
 Two more rounds of updates to the proposals were conducted with Boeing being 
picked by the selection board 
 However, in November 1962 McNamara selected General Dynamics' proposal  
 The GD aircraft had greater commonality between Air Force and Navy variants 
 The Boeing aircraft shared less than half of the major structural components.  
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F-111 (“TFX”)  
 A multipurpose tactical 
fighter bomber capable of 
supersonic speeds 
 1st terrain-following radar, 
allowing it to fly at high 
speeds and low altitudes  
 1st production aircraft with 
variable swing wings 
 1st crew escape module 
 Fixed-price incentive fee contract for R&D and first 
production lot 
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F-111 (“TFX”) Challenges 
 In an effort to accelerate schedule, the program introduced 
concurrency between the R&D phase and production  
 However numerous problems were uncovered during testing; 
this led to costly redesign and retrofits of the production 
versions.  
 Problems included inlet-engine compatibility, structural failures 
in the wing carry-through structure, and introduction of 
technically immature digital avionics system.   
 Navy dropped out 
 Cost growth, as calculated by  OSD CAIG, was over 100%.  
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“The technical difficulties experienced in the program suggest the 
data upon which the Government relied in support of its use of a 
fixed-price contract was considerably less firm than the 
Department believed it was.”    Staats, Elmer B., GAO 1970 
  
Congress recognizes problems with 
fixed-price development 
 In 1988 Congress passed Section 8118 of the Defense 
Appropriations Act 
 Section 8118 prohibited DoD from awarding a fixed-price 
contract in excess of $10 million for development of a major 
system or subsystem “unless the Undersecretary of Defense 
for Acquisition determines, in writing, that program risk has 
been reduced to the extent that realistic pricing can occur, and 
that the contract type permits an equitable adjustment and 
sensible allocation of program risk between the contracting 
parties.”  
 It also refines the FAR policy that cost-type contracts are 
usually more appropriate for development contracting due to 
program risk and uncertainty. (see FAR 35.006) 
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A-12 Avenger II Background 
 In 1984, the DepSecDef directed the Navy to develop 
and acquire the A-12 as a replacement for the Navy’s A-
6 attack aircraft. 
 The Navy intended the A-12 R&D program to design 
and develop eight new carrier-based aircraft 
 Stealth characteristics would significantly reduce the 
radar cross section  
 The aircraft would carry ordinance internally 
 Significant use of composites was planned--this would require 
dramatic advances in the structure and manufacturing 
capabilities 
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A-12 Avenger II 
 In 1988, the Navy awarded the Team of General Dynamics 
and McDonnell Douglas a $4.4 billion fixed-price incentive 
contract for full-scale development of the A-12  
 Eight aircraft to be delivered in 1991  
 Target price $4.379B, ceiling price $4.777B, 60/40 cost share 
 Planned buy was for 858 A/C 
 The A-12, an all-weather, carrier-
based stealth bomber, was 
designed to replace the A-6 
Intruder 
 Performance was planned to be 
better than either the A-6 or F-18 
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A-12 Avenger II Challenges 
 The program encountered significant delays and cost overruns, 
due to many technical problems  
 Difficulties in designing a low-observable plane that can survive the 
harsh "controlled crash" environment of a carrier-landing.  
 Complexity of the low-observable radar system 
 Extensive use of composites did not result in the anticipated weight 
savings 
 Some of the structural composites had to be replaced with heavier 
metal components 
 Post-cold war quantity reduced to 620 aircraft (vs. planned 858 A/C) 
 Contract cost was estimated to exceed the contract  ceiling by $1B 
 SecDef terminated the contract for default in 1991 
 Years of litigation between contractors and DoD 
 Recent Supreme Court decision (May 2011) set aside appeals court 
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A-12 Avenger Summary 
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“The A-12, I did terminate.  It was not an easy 
decision to make because it’s an important 
requirement that we’re trying to fulfill. But no once 
could tell me how much the program was going to 
cost, even just through the full scale development 
phase, or when it would be available.  And data that 
had been presented at one point a few months ago 
turned out to be invalid and inaccurate.” 
 
Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney, 1991 
  
Current Acquisition Environment 
The Obama Administration’s  government 
contracting reform initiative in 2009 
 Cost-reimbursement contracts “creates a risk… 
[that is]…wasteful, inefficient, subject to misuse, 
or otherwise not well designed …” 
 “there shall be a preference for fixed-price type 
contracts”  
President Obama 
 March 4, 2009 




 After its previous award was protested, the Air Force released a 
significantly revised KC-X RFP in February 2010.  
 Boeing won the new competition to develop and build 179 new 
KC-46s at an estimated cost of $51.7 billion.  
 The development portion of the contract (design and build 4 test 
aircraft, and then bring those aircraft to a final production 
configuration), is valued at $4.4 billion 
• Boeing is obligated to incorporate any mods required to correct flight 
test issues into the production line, without any additional cost to the 
AF 
 There are two contract options for 19 initial production aircraft 
 There are also additional contract options for production of the 
remaining 156 aircraft through year 2027, at a target production 
rate of 15 aircraft per year  
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KC-46 
 Schedule risk 
 Overlap among development and production activities 
 Testing schedule not executable as planned 
 Technical risk 
 Although based on commercial aircraft, there will structural modifications, a fly-
by-wire refueling system, and software integration 
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Contract amounts 
($M) 
Target price $4,327.3 







 The program development contract is a $4.4B 
fixed-price incentive contract 
 Current estimates are $900M higher than the 
February 2011 contract award amount (gov’t is 
responsible for about $500M) 
  
Lessons Learned 
A "Fixed-Price" contract is often anything but 
fixed-price; problems frequently caused by:  
 Technological unknowns 
 Changing requirements 
 Design stability   
 Inaccurate cost estimates 
 Production maturity 
 Knowing what to incentivize has also proven to be 
a challenge with fixed-price incentive contracts 
 




 Fixed-price contracts appear to be less risky than cost-
reimbursement contracts, but results prove that not to 
be the case. 
 Large, complex projects will generally experience 
schedule slips, technical changes, and cost growth, as 
the programs evolve. 
 Fixed-price contracts do not eliminate these challenges, 
and may produce perverse incentives that make the 
problems worse.  
 These lessons appear to be easily forgotten.  
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